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Abstract
Chinese investments overseas have seen strong growth rates in recent years. This has caused
much interest, but also some concerns. Taking recently puhlished official data as a starting point,
this article first recalls how overseas investments of Chinese enterprises have evolved in the past and
discusses what the current trend is. It then summarizes the main features of China's outward
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investment regime and discusses practical consequences of related rules and regulations. In its main
part, this article explores the broader implications of China's increasing outbound investments by
analyzing possible future scenarios and consequential risks, as well as available legal reactions.
I. Introduction
China's' economy recovered quickly from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.
During the first quarter of 2011, China's economy grew 9.7%, which is an impressive,
although slightly lower, growth rate compared to the 10.3% of the first quarter of 2010.2
It is believed that "China has surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in
the world."3 Some commentators expect China to take the number one spot from the
United States of America soon.4
In line with these developments, Chinese multi-nationals, in particular Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs),s are pushing across the borders. Consequently, Chinese over-
seas investments have seen strong growth rates in recent years. This has caused much
interest, but also some concerns. Taking statistical data recently published by the PRC
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),6 this article first recalls how overseas investments of
Chinese enterprises have evolved in the past and discusses what the current trend is.
China controls foreign inward investments by way of a variety of regulatory tools,7 and the
same is true for outward investments of Chinese enterprises. Section three, therefore,
summarizes the main features of China's outward investment regime.8 Section four dis-
cusses practical consequences of related rules and regulations. It also explores the broader
implications of China's increasing outbound investments. Based on possible future scena-
rios, it identifies risks and possible legal reactions.
1. Here and in the following "China" stands for the Chinese mainland excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan. After more than 150 years under colonial rule, Hong Kong and Macau became part of the People's
Republic of China and obtained the status of Special Administrative Regions on July 1, 1997 and on Dec. 20,
1999 respectively. Based on the "one country, two systems-doctrine," invented by the late Deng Xiaoping,
the legal systems of Hong Kong and Macau will remain unchanged for a period of fifty years from the date of
the so-called hand-over. Lutz-Christian Wolff, China's Private International Investment Law: One-Way Street
into PRC Law?, 56 AM. J. Comp. L. 1039, 1047-048 (2008). The situation of Taiwan is less settled, because
both the central government in Beijing and Taiwan's government officially claim to be the legitimate repre-
sentative for all of China. Id. at 1048.
2. Cary Huang, Foreigners Put Focus on China Services Sector, SoUT CHINA MORNING POST, May 18,
2011, at B6.
3. Frances L. Woo, Malcolm Moller & Tiffany Chan, China Outbound: To Infinity and Beyond-Offibore,
CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENT GUIDE, 2011, at 55, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2836570/
Channel/193438/China-Outbound-To-infinity-and-beyondOffshore.htnl.
4. John Gong, A Lot of Hot Air, SouTH CHINA MORNING PosT, May 23, 2011, at Al5.
5. LTrz-CHRISTIAN WOLFF, CHINA OuTBOUND INVESTMENTS: A GUIDE To LAW AND PRACTICE 4
(2011).
6. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, 2010 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA'S OUTWARD FOREIGN DI-
RECT INVESTMENT (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/13160696586
09.pdf.
7. Lurz-CHRIsTIAN WOLFF, MERGERS & AcousItrIONs IN CHINA: LAw AND PRACTICE 5-12 (4th ed.
2010).
8. Section 3 is an updated summary of a comprehensive study that was published in May 2011. See
WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5.
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II. Chinese Investments Overseas in Numbers9
A. INWARD VS. OUTWARD VOLUME
In the past, the focus of investment projects related to China was always on inward
projects conducted by foreign entities on the Chinese mainland. The huge potential of
the Chinese market and the relatively low labor costs suggested chances and opportunities
that were not to be missed. Recent data indicate that this trend will continue. For exam-
ple, between January and July 2011, the contracted foreign investment volume amounted
to 140,276 billion U.S.D., marking an increase of 20.71% year on year.o The volume of
actual used foreign investment was 69,187 billion U.S.D., which was an increase of
18.57% compared to 2010.11
Overseas investments of Chinese enterprises have seen similar impressive growth rates
only in recent times. Between 1990 and 2000, China's outward investment volume was
less than three billion U.S.D. per year.12 China's outward investment volume has, how-
ever, increased considerably since the beginning of the new millennium.IS The Chinese
government pushed this development with the initiation of its so-called "going-out pol-
icy," which was driven, in part, by the goal to convert China's huge foreign exchange
reserves of over two trillion U.S.D. into less risky tangible assets.' 4 After a temporary
slowdown resulting from the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, China's economy recov-
ered quickly, finally yet importantly due to a government stimulus package worth four
trillion RMB.15 The volume of Chinese investment projects overseas has rebounded
accordingly.16
In 2009 China ranked sixth worldwide in terms of its overseas investments,'7 contribut-
ing 5.1% to the aggregate global outward investment volume.18 In 2010 China's overseas
investment volume was, for the first time, bigger than Japan's. China now ranks fifth
9. Id. at 1-6.
10. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF JANUARY--JULY 2011 ON NATIONAL ABSORPTION OF
FDI (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestiment/201109/
20110907723320.html.
11. Compare id., andJane Cai, FDI Tapers OffAmid Global Turbulence, SourI' CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
20, 2011, at B3 (reporting that foreign direct investment in mainland China grew 7.88% in Sept. 2011,
marking a decrease from the 11.1% growth in Aug. 2011), witb Denise Tsang, Rising Costs to Hit Cbina's FDI
Rate, SouTI CHINA MORNING Posf, Nov. 17, 2011, at Bl-2.
12. Mellisa Murphy, Freeman Briefing: Issue in Focus: China's "Going Out" Investment Policy, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD., May 27, 2008, at 1, available at http://csis.org/publication/freeman-briefing-
may-27-2008.
13. See PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 82.
14. A Brave New World: The Climate of Chinese M&A Abroad, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2010, at




15. Wang Weidong & Geoffrey Mullen, China's Stimulus Package and the Infrastructure Sector, ASIAN-
COUNSEL, Mar. 2009, at 32-34.
16. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010, 6, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (uly 22, 2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/doestwir20lO en.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
WINTER 2011
1032 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
worldwidel 9 and has reached a total outflow volume of 68,811.31 billion U.S.D., of which
12.5% was financial and 87.5% was non-financial in nature. 20 As of the end of 2010, more
than 13,000 Chinese outward investors had invested in 16,000 foreign enterprises located
in 178 countries and regions.21 During the first half of 2011, Chinese companies invested
in 2,169 foreign enterprises in 117 countries and regions. 22 There is broad consensus that
China's overseas investment volume will continue to grow with force in the future. 23
B. TARGET COUNTRIES
According to official statistics, 24 in 2010, Chinese overseas direct investments were
spread in terms of the cumulative volume among different target regions as follows: 25
* Asia: 65.24%
* Latin America: 15.31%
* Europe: 9.82%
* North America: 3.81%
* Africa: 3.07%
* Oceania: 2.75%
China's investments in Asia have slightly decreased since 2010, mirrored by a modest
increase of investments in Europe, Latin America, and North America. In 2010, the fol-
lowing countries were ranked the top twenty-five destinations for Chinese investments
overseas (the 2009 top destinations are indicated in parenthesis): 26
(1) Hong Kong (Hong Kong)
(2) British Virgin Islands (Cayman Islands)
(3) Cayman Islands (Australia)
(4) Luxembourg (Luxembourg)













(18) South Africa (Cambodia)
(19) Hungary (Laos)






19. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2011, 9, 47, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011 (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir20l 1_embargoed
en.pdf.
20. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 79.
21. Id.
22. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF CHINA's NON-FINANcIAL FOREIGN DIRECT INvEST-
MENT IN THE FIRST HLALF OF 2010 (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/date/2011
07/20110707660092.html.
23. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 56.
24. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 83-87.
25. For 2009 see WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTs, supra note 5, at 2-3.
26. PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 83-87; for 2009 see WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND IN-
VESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 2.
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For tax structuring reasons, it is common practice for Chinese inward and outward
investors to take advantage of special purpose offshore companies. Special purpose com-
panies are normally located in low or zero tax jurisdictions and are used only to hold
investments onshore, sometimes through additional layers of other special purpose com-
panies. It is therefore not surprising to find Hong Kong, Luxembourg, the Cayman Is-
lands,27 and the British Virgin IslandS28 among the top destinations for Chinese
investments. In particular, more than fifty-five percent of China's investments overseas
were "channeled" through Hong Kong in past years. 29
In 2010, Chinese acquisitions of Canadian and U.S. companies increased by eighty-one
percent to 6.8 billion U.S.D. 30 This is seen as only the "beginning of a tidal wave" as
another one trillion to two trillion U.S.D. of Chinese investments in U.S. targets alone is
envisaged this decade.3' Commentators expect that Chinese investments in Europe will
also see a substantial increase in the years to come. 32 At the same time, Chinese invest-
ments in African countries have dropped proportionally from 3.8% of China's total over-
seas investment volume in 2009 to 3.07% in 2010.33
III. China's Outward Investment Regime
A. GENERAL
China's overseas investment regime is laid out in a variety of rules and regulations cov-
ering a number of subject areas, with different authorities in charge of their enactment,
interpretation, and enforcement. The existing legislative diversity, as well as the power
structure of the concerned government authorities, often makes it difficult to understand
the precise procedure to be followed by a Chinese enterprise planning to invest abroad.
Additional problems arise from the fact that laws and regulations are partly unclear,
inconsistent, or incomplete. 34
The main features of China's outward investment regune are summarized in the
following.35
27. For investments in Africa via the Cayman Islands, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, see Woo, Moller &
Chan, supra note 3, at 55.
28. See Naomi Rovnick, Caribbean Tax Haven Adds Heat to China's Hot Money, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
PosT, May 19, 2011, at Al, A4.
29. Enoch Yiu, Rules Hamper Use of Yuan for Overseas Investment, SoUTH CHINA MORNING PoST, June 14,
2011, at B3. For the practice of "round-tripping" see infra, Section 3, Part D.
30. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 55; James Flanigan, Ailing U.S. Firms Survive with a Helping
Hand from China, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 8, 2011, at 16 (in 2010, the value of Chinese
investments in U.S. companies was U.S. $5 billion); Eric Ng, PetroChina Quints Deal for Canada Gas Firm
Stake, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, June 23, 2011, at B4 (withdrawing from a Canadian $5.4 billion stake
in a natural gas project "has not affected PetroChina's overseas development plan and business strategy in
North America.").
31. Flanigan, supra note 30, at 16.
32. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 58.
33. Cf WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INvEsTMENTs, supra note 5, at 2.
34. Cf WOLFF, MERGERS & AcoInsrnONs IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 16.
35. Cf WOLFF, CHINA OUrrBOUND INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 13-27 (discussing approval and regis-
tration requirements); id. at 81-105 (discussing China's outbound investment tax aspects).
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B. NDRC APPROVAL
First, overseas investments in the form of direct investments, or M&A transactions,
conducted directly or indirectly through offshore subsidiaries by Chinese individuals, legal
persons, or other entities36 require the approval of the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC).37 The NDRC approval requirement is meant to ensure: (1) com-
pliance with Chinese laws and regulations; (2) compliance with industrial policies; (3) non-
violation of the sovereignty, security and public interest of the Chinese state and of inter-
national law; (4) general compliance with the overall economic and financial state plan-
ning and development; (5) financial viability; and (6) technical feasibility of Chinese
overseas investment projects. 38
Chinese outward investors are not allowed to sign any legally binding documents before
obtaining a NDRC Approval Certificate or a Filing Certificate.39 The Approval or Filing
Certificate issued by the NDRC, or the State Council, is required for Chinese outward
investors to go through mandatory foreign exchange, customs, immigration, and tax pro-
cedures.40 In principle, the NDRC decides whether approval is granted within twenty
working days from the acceptance of the project application report.41
The power of different NDRC levels to approve outward investment projects differs
depending on the size of a project, the target industry, and the target country or region. 42
Generally speaking, central level NDRC approval-in special cases with State Council
endorsement-is necessary for big or strategically important projects.43 Less important
projects are within the approval power of provincial-level NDRC branches or NDRC
branches at the level of municipalities directly under the central government, autonomous
36. Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009), art. 2 (China).
37. Compare Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment
Projects (promulgated by the Nat'1 Dev. & Reform Comm'n, June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009) (China),
and Notice on Record-Filing Certification for Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat'l Dev.
& Reform Comm'n Gen. Office, May 30, 2007, effective May 30, 2007) (China), with Notice on Relevant
Issues Concerning the Establishment of Risk Guarantee Mechanism for Key Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n and the China Export & Credit Ins. Corp., Jan. 25, 2005,
effective Jan. 25, 2005) (China).
38. Interim Measures for the Administration of Verification and Approval of Overseas Investment Projects
(promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Oct. 9, 2004, effective Oct. 9, 2004), art. 18 (China)
[hereinafter Interim Measures].
39. Id. art. 20 (supplemented by Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Establishment of Risk Guaran-
tee Mechanism for Key Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n
and the China Export & Credit Ins. Corp., Jan. 25, 2005, effective Jan. 25, 2005)) (China); Notice on Re-
cord-Filing Certification for Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm.
Gen. Office, May 30, 2007, effective May 30, 2007) (China); Notice on Issues Concerning the Improvement
of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat'I Dev. & Reform Comm'n,
June 8, 2009, effective June 8, 2009) (China); Notice on Delegating Powers on Approval of Overseas Invest-
ment Projects to Authorities at Lower Levels (promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Feb. 14,
2011, effective Feb. 14, 2011) (China)).
40. Interim Measures, mspra note 38, arts. 19-20.
41. Id. art. 11.
42. Notice on Delegating Powers on Approval of Overseas Investment Projects to Authorities at Lower
Levels (promulgated by the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Feb. 14, 2011, effective Feb. 14, 2011) at 1-4,
(China).
43. Interim Measures, supra note 38, arts. 4, 7.
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regions, cities under separate state planning, and the Xinjiang Production and Reform
Commission. 44
C. MOFCOM APPROVAL
Non-financial overseas investments by Chinese entities with legal person status 45 also
require the approval of MOFCOM.46 The MOFCOM approval requirement applies
whether an investment is direct or via the M&A mode, as well as in relation to the acquisi-
tion of control over foreign targets through other means.47 An "Enterprise Overseas In-
vestment Certificate" issued by MOFCOM upon approval48 enables a Chinese overseas
investor to handle foreign exchange, bank, customs, and other formalities.49 In addition,
offshore investments of subsidiaries controlled by Chinese outward investors are subject to
a MOFCOM filing requirement.50
Central-level MOFCOM approval is required for relatively large projects and projects
that are politically sensitive or that are conducted through special purpose companies.51
Projects with an investment volume between ten million and one hundred million U.S.D.,
projects in the field of energy and minerals, and projects needing to raise funds within
China, require provincial level MOFCOM approval. 52 For projects that are not within
the approval power of central level MOFCOM or of provincial level MOFCOM, a stan-
dardized Application Form for Overseas Investment 3 must be submitted online.54 Ac-
cording to MOFCOM, about eighty-five percent of all Chinese overseas investment
projects should fall within this category.ss
D. INDUSTRY-RELATED REQUIREMENTS
Special restrictions apply to Chinese overseas investments in regulated industry sectors.
Overseas investments by financial institutions are subject to the approval of the China
44. Id. art. 5.
45. Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investments (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
May 1, 2009, effective May 1, 2009), art. 2 [hereinafter Administrative Measures]. Overseas investments by
individuals and by China Investment Corporation (China's sovereign wealth fund company) are not covered
by the Administrative Measures. Neal Stender, Lin Lawrence Zhou & Yan Zeng, Outbound unbound?,
CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 15, 2009, at 18-19.
46. See Administrative Measures, supra note 45, and Notice on Joint Annual Inspection of Overseas Invest-
ments (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce and the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Dec. 28, 2009,
effective Dec. 28, 2009) (China); WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTs, supra note 5, at 17 (for special
rules enacted at provincial and municipal level). Overseas investments are prohibited if they endanger
China's sovereignty, national security or public interest, if they violate Chinese law, damage the relationships
with a foreign country, or involve technology or goods that are prohibited from being exported. Administra-
tive Measures, supra note 45, art. 9.
47. Administrative Measures, supra note 45, art. 38.
48. Id. arts. 5, 15.
49. Id. arts. 29, 30.
50. Id. art. 39.
51. Id. art. 6; id. art. 37 (for the term 'special purpose company').
52. Id. arts. 7, 14.
53. Id. art. 8.
54. Foreign Investment Management System, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, http://femhzs.mofcom.gov.cn/
feepmvc/pages/fem/LoginedHome.htnI (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
55. Michael Tan, Chinese Overseas Investment Summarized, CHINA L. & PRAc. Feb. 3, 2010, at 24-25.
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Banking Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE).56 The China Insurance Regulatory Commission must approve overseas invest-
ments in the insurance sector.57 Overseas investment projects of securities companies are
subjected to the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).58 Sim-
ilarly, overseas investments by companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock ex-
change, as well as investments into foreign listed target companies, also require CSRC
approval. Finally, involvement of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC) may be required for the state-owned sector.59
E. ROUND-TRIPPING
It has long been common practice for Chinese companies to engage in so-called round-
tripping practices.60 Round-tripping entails the establishment of a special purpose com-
pany abroad that then re-invests in China by establishing (artificial) foreign investment
enterprises (FIEs).61 The main goal of these structures was originally tax-related, as FIEs
enjoyed special tax holidays in China.62 China's corporate income tax reform in 2008 and
the recent steps to prevent tax evasion have made the use of round-trip investments for
legal tax optimization more difficult.63 According to anecdotal evidence round-tripping,
however, is still widely used for tax avoidance purposes. Round-tripping also offers access
to overseas debt financing through the special purpose company 64 and it allows circum-
venting onshore regulatory as well as practical problems related to listings on one of the
56. Law of the People's Republic of China of Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Feb. 1, 2007), art.
2; Certain Provisions on Financial Management of Financial Holding Companies (promulgated by the Minis-
try of Finance, Sept. 1, 2009, effective Sept. 1, 2009), art. 13 (China); Financial Rules for Financial Enter-
prises (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Dec. 7, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), arts. 24, 27 1[ 4 (China);
Notice on Issues Concerning Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investment of Domestic
Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., June 30, 2010, effective Sept. 1, 2010) (discussing
SAFE involvement).
57. Measures for the Administration of the Establishment of Overseas Insurance Institutions by Insurance
Companies (promulgated by the China Ins. Regulatory Comm'n, July 31, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), art.
14 (China); Provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies (promulgated by the China Ins. Regu-
latory Comm'n, Sept. 25, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009), art. 74 (China); Administrative Measures Regarding
Investment of Non-Insurance Institutions in Overseas Insurance Enterprises (promulgated by the China Ins.
Regulatory Comm'n, July 31, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), art. 6 (China); Measures for the Administration
of Insurance Conglomerates (Interim) (promulgated by the China Ins. Regulatory Comm'n, Mar. 12, 2010,
effective Mar. 12, 2010), arts. 9, 15 (China); Joel H. Rothstein, Insurance as a Transforming Force for China Real
Ertate, CHINA L. & PRAc. Dec. 9, 2009, at 20-23; Zhan Hao, Ruling the Expanding Insurance Group Kingdom,
CHINA L. & PRAc. May 12, 2010, at 20-21.
58. Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of Securities Companies (promulgated by the State
Council, Apr. 23, 2008, effective June 1, 2008), art. 13 (China).
59. Interim Measures for Administration of Overseas State-owned Property Rights of Central Enterprises
(promulgated by the State-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm'n of the State Council, June 14, 2011,
effective July 1, 2011), arts. 2, 8 (China).
60. Also called: "outbound-inbound investments."




64. Robert Cookson, Investors Warned of Chinese Debt Danger, FIN. TIMEs, July 21, 2011, at 35.
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Chinese stock exchanges in Shanghai or Beijing65 by listing the special purpose company
offshore. Offshore special purpose companies established by mainland entities for round-
tripping purposes have also been popular targets of investments by foreign private equity
funds.66
Since 2005, Chinese legislators have taken a tougher stance against round-tripping. 67 A
SAFE registration and MOFCOM approval system for all outward foreign currency trans-
fers was created.68 The SAFE registration requires not only a prior issuance of the
MOFCOM approval document,69 but also a track record of at least three years for domes-
tic enterprises using offshore special purpose companies for round-trip investments as well
for the special purpose company itself.70 Furthermore, if any round-trip transaction en-
tails the acquisition of an onshore domestic enterprise, such enterprise will in principle
not enjoy FIE status71 and will be subject to central MOFCOM approval.72 Finally, the
overseas listing of an entity owned by mainland shareholders and established as a special
purpose company for such listing purpose is subject to CSRC approval, MOFCOM ap-
proval, NDRC verification, and SAFE approval and must comply with certain other
preconditions. 3
F. FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL
China still operates a rather strict foreign exchange control system.74 As a matter of
principle, foreign exchange (FOREX) cannot be used for payment purposes in China.75
65. Lu Haitian et al., Venture Capital and the Law in China, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 229, 251 (2007).
66. Marcia Ellis & Auria Styles, Rethinking M&A in China, 34 CHINA Bus. REv. 36, 36 (2007).
67. See WOLFF, MERGERS & Acouisrnows IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 202-204.
68. See Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange from Domestic
Residents' Financing Through Overseas Special Purpose Vehicles and for Round-trip Investments (Circular
75), (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange Oct. 21, 2005, effective Nov. 1, 2005) (LEXIS
China Online) (China); Neil Stender & Zeng Yan, It's SAFE Again for China Venture Capital Round-trip dr Red-
chip Listings, CHINA L. & PRAc., Nov. 2005, at 15-18; Neil Stender et al., SAFE Plugs Holes for China/
Offsbore Round-trip Investments, CHINA L. & PRAc., July 2007, at 58-60; see also Operation Rules on Relevant
Issues regarding Foreign Exchange Control over the Financing and Return of Investment of Domestic Re-
sidents through Overseas Special Purpose Companies, (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Ex-
change, May 20, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online).
69. Stender, supra note 68, at 58-60.
70. WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMENTs, supra note 5, at 23; see now the SAFE Rules of Operation
for the FOREX Administration of Financing and Round-trip Investments of Chinese Citizens through Spe-
cial Purpose Companies (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 20, 2011, effective July
1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China) (relating to individual round trip investors).
71. Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Provisions (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce, effective June 22, 2009), art. 9, 3 (LEXIS China Online) (China).
72. Id. art. 11.
73. Id. arts. 40-47; Ellis, supra note 66, at 36; Jonathan Zhou, Little Red Chips Get an Overseas Opening,
CHINA L. & PRAc., May 2009, at 18.
74. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration (promulgated by
the State Council of the People's Republic of China, effective Aug. 5, 2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China)
[hereinafter PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration] (supplemented by a large number of
Circulars on specific topics).
75. Id. art. 8.
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SAFE approval is required for the provision of security to foreign parties76 and the grant-
ing of commercial loans to foreign parties by domestic non-banking institutions.77
Only designated financial institutions78 are allowed to engage in FOREX business and
have to operate special FOREX accounts for this purpose.79 All incoming and outgoing
FOREX payments have to be reported.80 SAFE registration is required before foreign
investors can open FOREX accounts. 8' SAFE has the right to inspect and examine
FOREX transactions at any time.82 SAFE can also impose penalties in case of violations.83
In response to the difficulties caused by the global financial crisis, China's foreign ex-
change control system saw some liberalization in 2009.84 Amongst other measures,s the
FOREX management system related to overseas investments was improved. 86 Chinese
enterprises are now allowed to make overseas investments with their own foreign ex-
change funds, domestic foreign exchange loans, foreign exchange purchased with RMB
funds, tangible assets, intangible assets, and other FOREX sources,87 subject to SAFE
registration and approval.88 Chinese entities and individuals no longer need to convert
current account FOREX receipts into RMB. 89 Moreover, Chinese individuals and enti-
ties may now keep offshore current account FOREX receipts offshore, i.e. these receipts
76. Id. art. 19.
77. Id. art. 20.
78. Id. art. 24.
79. Id. art. 24.
80. Id. arts. 6-7.
81. Id. art. 16.
82. Id. arts. 12, 33; Amy Chen & Jonathan Selvadoray, PRC Foreign Exchange Administration Regulations
Revised, CHINA L. & PiAc., Oct. 2008, at 27.
83. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, arts. 39-49 (LEXIS China Online).
84. See, e.g., Notice on Questions Regarding the Administration of Onshore FOREX Accounts of Foreign
Institutions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, July 13, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China).
85. WOLFF, MERGERS & ACQUISiTIONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 226-228.
86. See, e.g., Provisions on Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investments by Domestic
Institutions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, July 13, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China); see also Notice Regarding Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas
Direct Investment by Domestic Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 30,
2010, effective Sept. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Assessment of the Implemen-
tation of Foreign Exchange Regulations by Banks (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange,
effective Aug. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
87. Provisions on Foreign Exchange Administration for Overseas Direct Investments by Domestic Institu-
tions (LEXIS China Online).
88. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 9 (LEXIS China Online); Notice on Can-
celling and Adjusting the Examination and Approval Power and Administration Policies for Some Foreign
Exchange Businesses under Capital Accounts (promulgated by State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 23,
2011, effective June 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Circular on Several Issues Regarding the Sub-
mission of Tax Certificates for Overseas Payments in the Service Industry (jointly promulgated by the State
Admin. of Foreign Exchange & the State Admin. of Tax'n, Nov. 25, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) (LEXIS
China Online) (China) (providing that tax certificates need to be submitted to competent tax authorities when
domestic entities and individuals make overseas payments of more than 30,000 U.S.D.).
89. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 13 (LEXIS China Online); Notice on Is-
sues Regarding the Administration of Foreign Exchange for Foreign Lending by Domestic Enterprises
(promulgated by State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009) (LEXIS China
Online) (China); Liu Yi & Philip Zhengyu Ding, Shareholder Loans Permitted to Overseas Subsidiaries, CHINA L.
& PRAc., July 2009, at 40.
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do not have to be repatriated. 90 Even RMB investments overseas are now possible under
measures introduced in early 2011,91 although Chinese outward investors still seem to
prefer using FOREX for overseas investment purposes supposedly due to the much easier
approval procedure.
G. FINANCING92
Since December 6, 2008, qualified commercial Chinese banks are allowed to grant
loans for M&A purposes to domestic purchasers of target companies and their offshore
special purpose companies. 93 In this regard, certain preconditions must be fulfilled, e.g.
banks must establish suitable risk-management systems and meet a high capital adequacy
ratio of at least ten percent and maintain a specific loan loss reserve adequacy ratio of at
least one hundred percent. 94 FOREX debt financing of overseas investment projects has
been possible since August 2009.95 Upon fulfillment of certain preconditions, domestic
enterprises can provide loans to their offshore subsidiaries by making use of their foreign
exchange funds, purchased foreign exchange funds, or currency sourced from foreign cur-
rency pools of their group companies. 96
H. MERGER CONTROL
China's rather new merger control regime is developing fast and has generated a lot of
interest in recent years. China's merger control rules apply to transactions inside and
outside mainland China, provided that they affect competition within the Chinese mar-
kets. 97 Chinese outward -investments may consequently fall within the scope of
applicability.98
90. PRC Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration, art. 9 (LEXIS China Online); Chen, supra note
82, at 26; Operation Rules on Relevant Issues Regarding Foreign Exchange Control over the Financing and
Return of Investment of Domestic Residents through Overseas Special Purpose Companies (promulgated by
the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 20, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
91. Administrative Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement of Outbound Direct Investment (promulgated
by the People's Bank of China, Jan. 6, 2011, effective Jan. 6, 2011) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
92. See Jun Dai, Financing of China Outbound Investments, in WOLFF, CHINA OuTBouND INVESTMENTS,
supra note 5, at 9-70; see also Xi Chao, Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors, in WOLFF, CHINA OurBOUND
INVESTMENTS, supra note 5, at 71-79.
93. Guidelines for Risk Management of the Merger Loans of Commercial Banks (promulgated by the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, Dec. 6, 2008, effective Dec. 6, 2008) (LEXIS China Online)
(China).
94. Id. § 1.
95. Notice on Issues Regarding the Administration of Foreign Exchange for Foreign Lending by Domestic
Enterprises (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009)
(LEXIS China Online) (China).
96. Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas Loans
Granted by Domestic Enterprises, arts. 1, 6, and 7 (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange,
June 9, 2009, effective Aug. 1, 2009); Regulator Makes Outbound Investment Easier, CHINA L. & PRAc., July
2009, at 9.
97. People's Republic of China Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 2 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China) [hereinafter PRC Anti-
Monopoly Law]; Marc Williams, The Impact of the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHINA OuTBOuND INVESTMENTS,
supra note 5, at 43-58 (2011).
98. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 2 (LEXIS China Online).
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China's current merger control regime is based on the PRCAnti-Monopoly Law, which
became effective on August 1, 2008.99 The merger control rules of the PRCAnti-Monopoly
Law are supplemented by a large number of implementation rules and regulationsoo en-
acted after August 2008 and to be enacted in the future. Supervision and enforcement of
China's merger control rules are within the scope of authority of MOFCOM.10
MOFCOM must be notified 02 and specific documents must be submitted if a transaction
meets one of the following thresholds: 03
(1) the aggregate global turnover'04 of all the concerned enterprises exceeded RMB 10
billion in the previous financial year and the turnover within China'05 of at least two of
the parties exceeded RMB 400 million in the previous financial year; or
(2) the aggregate turnover within China of all the concerned parties exceeded RMB 2
billion in the previous financial year, and the turnover within China of at least two con-
cerned parties exceeded RMB 400 million in the same period. 06
99. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law; supra note 97, art. 57; Williams, supra note 97; WOLFF, MERGERS & Ac-
QuisrrIoNs IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 247-71.
100. See, e.g., Regulations Concerning Thresholds for the Notification of Concentrations of Business Oper-
ators (promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Aug. 3, 2008, effective Aug. 3,
2008) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines for Conducting Anti-Monopoly Examinations Regarding
Concentrations of Business Operators (Jan. 1, 2009); Guidelines for the Notification of Concentrations of
Business Operators (promulgated by the Anti-Trust Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effec-
tive Jan. 5, 2009) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines for the Documents and Materials for the Notifi-
cation of Concentrations of Business Operators (promulgated by the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry
of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effective Jan. 5, 2009) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Guidelines of the Anti-
Monopoly Commission Under the State Council Concerning the Definition of Relevant Markets (promul-
gated by Anti-Monopoly Comm'n of the State Council, May 24, 2009, effective, May 24, 2009); Measures for
the Examination of the Concentrations Between Undertakings, (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce,
Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Reporting of Concen-
trations of Business Operators (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1,
2010 China) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Tentative Provisions on Implementing Divestiture of Assets or
Business in Concentration of Undertakings (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, July 5, 2010, effec-
tive July 5, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China); Measures for the Calculation of Turnover for the Consoli-
dated Declaration of the Business Operators in Financial Industry (promulgated jointly by the Ministry of
Commerce, the People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Comm'n, China Securities Regulatory
Comm'n, and China Insurance Regulatory Comm'n, July 15, 2009, effective Aug. 15, 2009) (LEXIS China
Online) (China).
101. WOLFF, MERGERS & AcQuisrflONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 251. MOFCOM has established an
Anti-Monopoly Bureau. See MOFCOM, Anti-Monopoly Bureau, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn (last visited on
Nov. 18, 2011). The Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council is in charge of strategic and coordina-
tion work. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 97, art. 9 ] 1; see also Susan Ning, Overview of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, CHINA L. & PRAC., Oct. 2007, at 23-25; Sharon Mann, Competition Law and Polky Develop-
ments in China: the New Anti-Monopoly Law, ASIAN COUNSEL, June 2008, at 42-46.
102. For details of the notification requirements, see Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Busi-
ness Operators (LEXIS China Online).
103. Regulations Concerning Thresholds for the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators, art.
3 (LEXIS China Online); Alexander Vincent, Notification Thresholds for Merger Control, CHINA L. & PRAC r.,
Sept. 2008, at 42-43.
104. For a definition of "turnover," see Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Business Operators,
arts. 4-7 (LEXIS China Online).
105. "In China" is defined in Measures for the Reporting of Concentrations of Business Operators, art. 4, 1
2 (LEXIS China Online).
106. For transactions conducted within the finance industry by banks, securities companies, futures compa-
nies, and other financial institutions, the turnover that triggers the notification requirement shall be calcu-
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MOFCOM can allow transactions subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions. 07
MOFCOM should reach a final decision within ninety days. 08 Between 2008 and the end
of 2010, MOFCOM cleared over 207 transactions, subjected six transactions to condi-
tions, and disallowed one transaction. 09 Until mid-December 2011, an additional 194
notifications had been received of which 160 have been reviewed and closed."10 Four
cases were granted conditional approval and five cases were withdrawn.i' None of the
published MOFCOM decisions involve any Chinese overseas investment project or re-
lates to purely Chinese transactions without foreign involvement.112
I. INVESTMENTS IN HONG KONG, MACAU, AND TAIWAN
In line with the concept "one country, two systems,"ll3 investments by mainland enter-
prises in Hong Kong and Macau are treated like investments in foreign countries.1 4 Spe-
cial rules apply in relation to investments by mainland enterprises in Taiwan."i5 These
rules have been enacted against the background of the conclusion of an Economic Coopera-
tion Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was signed by mainland and Taiwan representa-
tives in June 2010 and became effective on September 12, 2010.116 Investments by
mainland entities in Taiwan, including investments via offshore vehicles, require NDRC
and MOFCOM approval." 7 In addition, the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office has to
be involved in the approval process.1s Preferential treatment under the ECFA as well as
special government support, e.g. in the form of special consultancy services, are available
lated on the basis of only ten percent of the turnover. Measures for the Calculation of Turnover for the
Consolidated Declaration of the Business Operators in Financial Industry (LEXIS China Online).
107. PRC Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 97, art. 23.
108. For the possibility to extend this period see id. art. 26, 2.
109. Susan Ning & Huang Jing, MOFCOM Revealed Yearly Merger Control Statistics, CHINA LAW INSIGHT,
Sept. 26, 2011, http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/mofcom-
revealed-yearly-merger-control-statistics.
110. Susan Ning, Liwei Wang & Hazel Yin, AMB Director Shang Ming Speaks on Merger Enforcement in
20.11, CHINA LAW INSIGHT, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.kingandwood.com/practice.aspx?id=antitrust-competi-
tion&language=en.
111. Id.
112. WOLFF, MERGERS & AcQulsmtIoNs IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 261-62.
113. Wolff, supra note 1.
114. This is because regulations such as the "Administrative Measures on Matters to be Verified for Invest-
ments in and Establishment of Enterprises in the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions by
Mainland Enterprises," originally effective Aug. 31, 2004, are no longer in force.
115. Measures for the Administration of Investments of Mainland Enterprises in Taiwan (promulgated by
the National Development and Reform Comm'n, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Taiwan Affairs Office
of the State Council, Nov. 9, 2010, effective Nov. 9, 2010) (CHINA L. & PRACr.) (China); Yujing Shu et al.,
New Regulations Governing Investment in Taiwan by Mainland Enterprises, CHINA OuTBouND INVESTMENT
GUIDE 2011, at 87-89, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2836629/Channel/193438/New-regulations-
goveming-investment-in-Taiwan-by-mainland-enterprises.html; Wolff, Approval and Registration Require-
ments, in WOLFF, CHINA OUTBOUND INVESTMEN-rs, supra note 5, at 13-27.
116. Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China,
http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/populace/news/News.aspxkind= I &menu id=40&newsid= 19723 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011).
117. Administrative Measures for Mainland Enterprises Investing in the Taiwan Region, arts. 4-6. (promul-
gated by the Ministry of Commerce, the Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the
State Council, Nov. 9, 2010, effective Nov. 9, 2010) (LEXIS China Online) (China).
118. Id. art. 7.
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subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria.1 19 NDRC examination and MOFCOM ex-
amination of Taiwan investment projects are to be conducted in line with the Interim
Measures and the Administrative Measures.2 0 The completion as well as any amendment of
the investment formalities in Taiwan must be registered with the NDRC, MOFCOM, and
the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office within fifteen working days.121
IV. Status Quo and Possible Future Developments: Is Action Required?
A. DELAYS OF ONSHORE APPROVALS
As set out in the previous sections, Chinese enterprises are facing a number of restric-
tions when investing overseas. China's outward investment regime is diversified and com-
plex.122 Consequently, it is often difficult in practice to find out what precisely the legal
requirements are in a particular case to obtain clearance for an overseas investment pro-
ject.123 Furthermore, in some cases it was troublesome to obtain the necessary approvals
at all. It has even been suggested that delays of over one year may have to be expected
depending on the facts of a particular case despite the existing statutory timelines. In
many other cases, however, the process apparently did not create any difficulties and the
necessary approvals were obtained without many problems after some negotiations with
the relevant authorities.124
Chinese outward investors and their foreign counterparts can of course be adversely
affected by any delay. The fact that it cannot be predicted precisely at what point in time
the Chinese approval authorities may clear a project creates uncertainties, which require
close attention.125 As the required approvals are de facto closing conditions for overseas
investment projects, China's overseas investment rules need to be considered with great
care when planning and structuring Chinese outward transactions as well as when drafting
underlying documentation. Statutory timelines and the possibility of delays beyond those
timelines must be taken into account.126 Moreover, it has been reported that the approval
requirements may have, in some cases, jeopardized the chances of Chinese outward inves-
tors by delaying the finalization of investment decisions and giving other non-Chinese
investors a competitive advantage in terms of timing when it came to bid for lucrative
targets.127
119. Id. art. 14.
120. Id. arts. 7, 9.
121. Id. art. 11.
122. See supra section m.
123. Id.
124. See Jason Chan, Restructuring First for Outbound Chinese MirA, CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 2011, at 15.
125. For a similar problem in relation to inward investments, see Lutz-Christian Wolff, International AivA
and the Problem of the Effective Date under Chinese La, 33 COMMON LAW WORLD REv. 283, 283-94 (2004).
126. Benesh, Friedlaender, Coplan & Aranoff, LLP, China Goes Global: Eramining China's Outbound Invest-
ment, CHINA INSIGHTS, Jan. 2010, at 5; Stender, supra note 45, at 18-19.
127. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 14, at 198.
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B. Is CHINA TAKING CONTROL OF THE WORLD'S MIARKETS?
While its rapidly increasing outward investment volume evidences China's economic
strength, many other parts of the world are struggling to overcome ongoing economic
problems. In particular, it became clear in the summer of 2011 that the global economic
problems, which had been thought to be solved in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis,
continue to exist. The crisis is ongoing and may have even deepened. All of a sudden,
China is seen not only as being strong enough to come to the aid of failing European
economies, but also as "a potential savior of the global economy." 28
At the same time, enterprises, particularly in the West and in Japan, have become cheap
targets for Chinese investments.129 This provokes the question of whether many parts of
the world's economies will soon be controlled by Chinese enterprises, and, if so, whether
this should give rise to concerns and whether any action is required. Cases in which pro-
posed Chinese investments have been blocked by competent state authorities, in particular
in the United States and Australia for state security reasons,130 seem to confirm fears along
these lines.131 In this regard, it must also be considered that Chinese SOEs are the driving
force behind China's overseas investments.132 Even more than other Chinese enterprises
SOEs are said to be ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.133 Is it con-
sequently necessary to assume that the Chinese Communist Party will soon be in charge
of a rapidly growing number of non-Chinese multi-nationals and, thus, greater portions of
128. Cary Huang, World's Banker ofChoice, S. CI-HNA MORNING PosT, Oct. 1, 2011, atA7, available at http:/
/topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Worlds-banker-of-choice.
129. See Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 14, at 4; Takahiko Hyuga, Japan Says "Ni Hao" as Brands
Trump Diplomatic Tensions in China Takeovers, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2010, 1:12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
con/news/2010-12-15/japan-says-ni-hao-as-brands-trump-diplomacy-for-china-deals.html; Woo, Moller &
Chan, supra note 3, at 56.
130. See Susan Ning, Yin Ranran & HuangJing, List of Outbound Investments by Chinese Companies Scrutinized
for National Security Concerns, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Mar. 11, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://www.chinalawinsight.
com/2011/03/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/list-of-outbound-investments-by-chinese-companies-
scrutinized-for-national-security-concems/; Bien Perez, Huawei Calls US' Bluff on Security Threat Claims, S.
CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 26, 2011, at Al, A6; see also UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010, supra
note 16, at 76-81 (reporting that recent developments at the level of national investment regimes are to a
certain extent ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a trend to increasing liberalization. On the other hand,
domestic regimes, as well as the attitude of those bodies in charge of the implementation of these regimes,
show signs of new protectionism.).
131. In light of national security systems in other countries and the increasing foreign investment volume in
China via the M&A route, China has, in the meantime, established its own national security system based on
article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China. See generally Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'1 People's Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in 2008 China Law LEXIS 1761. See also generally Circular of the
General Office of State Council on Establishment of the Security Review System for Merger and Acquisition
of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the General Office of the State Council, Feb.
3, 2011, effective Mar. 4, 2011), translated in 2011 China Law LEXIS 118; Provisions of the Ministry of
Commerce on the Implementation of the Safety Review System for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept.
1, 2011), translated in 2011 China Law LEXIS 573.
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. See RICHARD McGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA'S COMMUNIST RULERS 54
(2010).
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foreign markets?' 34 Do potential target countries have to tighten controls of Chinese
inward investments via their national security control systems?
A closer look reveals that related fears are unsubstantiated, at least at this point in time.
First, it appears to be a natural consequence of China's new economic strength and the
liberalization of the Chinese economic system over the past three decades that Chinese
enterprises are globalizing their operations.135 There is no hard evidence suggesting that
Chinese outward investors are not behaving like any other multi-national enterprise with
headquarters in other countries. In particular, it cannot be argued that Chinese outward
investors are following a more aggressive investment policy than other countries. There is
also no evidence that Chinese investments overseas are aimed at conquering foreign mar-
kets in order to increase China's political power.136 In particular, China's overseas invest-
ment regime, as outlined above, appears to be more restrictive than those in most Western
countries. Furthermore, UNCTAD has drawn attention to the fact that while most of
China's outward investors are SOEs, it appears that the number of Chinese SOEs that
have invested abroad is still comparatively small.137 Finally, despite China's impressive
growth rates, its overseas investment volume is still rather moderate compared with the
size of the country and its population in relation to its gross domestic product (GDP).38
Also, as already mentioned, in 2010 China's portion of global foreign direct investment
(FD1) outflows reached only approximately 5.1%.139
C. GLOBAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND SOcIO-POLrcAL ONSHORE PROBLEMS
While China's economic development in the past years was impressive, as outlined in
the previous sections, it cannot be ignored that there are actual and potential problems
and risks. In fact, some commentators have argued that China's fast economic growth is
unbalanced and unsustainable:
One worry is that the first wave of bad loans from China's huge 2008-2009 stimulus
is about to hit. The bigger concern is how growth in recent years left the domestic
financial system less resilient. China's expansion relies on various counterproductive
policies: an undervalued, nonconvertible currency, off-balance-sheet arrangements to
mask debt and ample credit to politically connected firms that don't necessarily make
the most productive use of capital.140
In this regard, China's economic growth over the past decades in absolute numbers
does not say much about the economic competitiveness and the sustainability of its econ-
134. Id.
135. WOLFF, MERGERS & AcQuisrriONs IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 197.
136. Id.
137. UNCTAD WorldInvestment Report 2011, supra note 19, at 31.
138. Compare Gong, supra note 4, at Al5 (describing China's GDP and GDP per capita) with supra Part II.A
(describing China's overseas investment volume).
139. Woo, Moller & Chan, supra note 3, at 79; PRC MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, supra note 6, at 79.
140. William Pesek,John Paulson, Subprime God, Flees Muddy Waters, BLOOMBERG (June 21, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-2 1/john-paulson-subprime-god-flees-muddy-waters-william-
pesek.htmi. See also David Barboza, Threat Lurking Under China's Explosive Growth, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
July 8, 2011, at 1, 17; McGREGOR, supra note 133, at 269.
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omy.141 In 2011, China's current GDP does not even reach one-tenth of the per-capita
level of that of the United States.14 2 While some commentators have argued that "there is
no imminent threat of an economy-collapsing banking crisis,"I4 3 China's finance industry
has been said to carry huge risks due to bad loans.144 Moreover, the rising off-balance
sheet exposure of Chinese bankss45 could at any time trigger a chain reaction within the
Chinese economy that may be difficult to control.14 6
In addition, debt-financing strategies through offshore special purpose companies 4 7
could lead to considerable risk exposure of inward investors.148 If money borrowed by a
special purpose company is-as usual-used for investments in China, then foreign credi-
tors have no direct entitlement to the assets of the onshore investee company if the com-
pany encounters economic difficulties.14 9 In addition, under mainland China's foreign
exchange control rules, the investee company would, in such a case, be able to remit only
after-tax profits abroad to service the offshore debt via the special purpose company. 50
Commentators have drawn attention to the fact that these profits-if any-may be insuffi-
cient under the current market conditions to pay off offshore debts leading to refinancing
needs in due course.' 5 '
The lack of transparency due to insufficient corporate governance structures of Chinese
companies, as recently exposed in relation to Chinese companies listed overseas, adds to
the problems and a declining confidence in the Chinese economy. 52 It must also be
considered that China can no longer automatically be regarded as a low-cost country.ss
In contrast, China must compete globally, i.e., based on technological innovation and su-
perior market expertise.' 5 If and how China will be able to meet this challenge remains
to be seen.
141. Gong, supra note 4.
142. Id. Gong also points out that immediately before the downfall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, China held
the top GDP spot worldwide, at 241 billion U.S.D.
143. Barboza, supra note 140, at 17; see also INT'l MONETARY FUND, People's Republic of China: Financial
System Stability Assessment: IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 11/321 7 (2011) [hereinafter IMF REPORT], available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/car/longres.aspx?sk=25350.0.
144. See Pesek, supra note 140; IMF REPORT, supra note 143, at 28.
145. See IMF REP'ORT, supra note 143, at 25; Barboza, supra note 140, at 1; Lnlu Chen, Fitch Sees Growing
Risk on Mainland, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, June 23, 2011, at B3; Pesek, supra note 140, at BIO.
146. See IMF REPORT, supra note 143, at 35.
147. See supra Part i.E.




152. See Pesek, supra note 140, at B10 (observing that "China's prospects are becoming as murky as the
governance of its companies"); Sophie Yu, Mainland Net Stocks Fall on U.S. Fraud Allegations, S. CHINA
MORNING Posr, Oct. 1, 2011, at Bl.
153. Gong, supra note 4.
154. See id.
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Moreover, China's dramatic income disparity has caused concern. 155 About 150 million
Chinese live on less than one U.S.D. per day. 5 6 Hum.an rights violations, struggles over
land rights, management-labour problems,' 57 economic problems, and social unrest are
reported almost on a daily basis,' 58 although one must assume that only a very small per-
centage of what is actually happening is being published.
Considering all of this from the viewpoint of Chinese investments overseas, it is obvious
that the more interwoven China's economy is with foreign economies, the greater the risk
that onshore problems could also have a considerable impact abroad.159 At this point in
time, one can, of course, only speculate how severe these onshore problems are and pre-
cisely what their impact may be. Despite the pessimistic comments reported above, it
seems unlikely that China's national economy will, in the short and medium term, run
into large-scale problems triggering a global crisis. It is, however, prudent not to ignore
the situation altogether, but to assume that it is possible that Chinese overseas investors
may encounter economic difficulties.160 Careful structuring of cooperation projects with
Chinese partners and diligent drafting of the underlying contract documents should aim at
avoiding unnecessary exposure.
One special aspect that should be considered is the possibility that Chinese entities with
overseas investments and Chinese business partners in general become insolvent.161
China has revised its insolvency system as of June 1, 2007 when the new PRC Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law entered into force.162 The new PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law unifies the
previously applicable separate regimes for SOEs and other entities 6 3 and now covers all
mainland business entities with legal person status.164 It was one of the main goals of the
reform of China's insolvency system to provide a practicable set of rules to address the
155. See id. (describing the problem in terms of per capita GDP); Jerome A. Cohen, Happy Returns?, S.
CHINA MORNING Posi, June 21, 2011, at Al3, available at http://www.usasialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/06/2011.06.22-SCMP-Cohen-Happy-returns.pdf.
156. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, Anti-Poverty Experts in Commission for Social Develop-
ment Offer Ways to Keep Ranks of People Without Adequate Food, Clothing, Shelter From Swelling; Dis-
connect Between Reality of Poverty-Actions of Governments Explored, as Panelists, Delegates Alike Call
for Alternative Poverty-Eradication Paradigm, U.N. Press Release SOC/4772 (Feb. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 1/soc4772.doc.htm.
157. See, e.g., Mimi Lau, Strikers Dragged Offas Police and Bosses Get Tough, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, June
24, 2011, at A7; see also Cohen, supra note 155.
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hen, supra note 155, at A13.
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situation of insolvent companies, in particular SOEs.165 While on paper the previous re-
gimes may have been sufficient in this regard, it was the implementation of related rules
that had failed.166 It is still unclear if the new PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has really
improved the situation. 167
Under China's insolvency regime, the insolvency of legal person entities can lead to
their liquidation, reorganization, or settlement arrangements between the debtor and its
creditors.168 Proceedings are commenced on the basis of a non-mandatory application by
a creditor (or even the debtor itself) to the competent People's Court.169 As for cross-
border insolvency, more precisely the availability of overseas assets for the distribution to
creditors of an insolvent Chinese legal entity, the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law applies
the concept of universality.170 From the perspective of Chinese law, onshore insolvency
proceedings should also cover overseas assets, including stakes in foreign business enti-
ties.171 The implementation of this rule is, of course, subject to the laws of the country
where related assets are located.172
D. GEO-POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RISKS
China's outward investment projects, in particular China's investments in Africa, have
sparked some discussion as to the way they were implemented and the rationale behind
the selection of particular target countries.173 As indicated above,' 74 a relatively large per-
centage of China's investments overseas found its way into Asian target countries, while a
still remarkable portion ended up in Africa and Latin America.175 In contrast, cumulative
investment ratios in North America and Europe are relatively low, although this appears
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to be changing176 with Chinese investments now specifically targeting companies with
advanced technology,177 global brands, and trade names.178
According to official Chinese sources, Chinese overseas investments are industry ori-
ented, i.e., they are focused on those countries where the conditions for a particular type
of investment or investments in a particular industry are the best.179 In contrast, some
foreign commentators have identified strategic interests behind many of China's invest-
ment projects overseas. In particular, it has been noted that China must secure its supplies
with natural resources, energy, and rare earths's 0 to fuel its economic growth.181 Indeed,
between 2004 and 2009 almost fifty percent of the acquisitions of Chinese investors over-
seas worth more than fifty million U.S.D. were aimed at targets in the natural resource
and energy sectors.182 According to UNCTAD, in recent years more than twenty percent
of China's total overseas investment volume was in the extractive industries. 83
Others have suggested that China's overseas investments may be driven by attempts to
"buy" United Nations voting power through investments in developing countries, in par-
ticular in Africa and Latin America.184 According to another viewpoint, China simply
invests where other countries have yet to invest, i.e., China is picking up what has not been
targeted by non-Chinese. 85 Finally, there have been reports that Chinese entities have
often found it difficult to adjust to the Western cultural environment.186 This could ex-
176. See Flanigan, supra note 30, at 54 (North America); O'Neill, supra note 14, at 16-17 (Europe); Woo,
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plain why Chinese enterprises prefer to invest in Asia rather than in Western countries. 8 7
Adding to the difficulties of Chinese overseas investors in Western markets could be the
reluctance to take advantage of high quality but expensive legal, financial, and industry-
related consultancy services when setting up and developing business abroad.1 88
All the above reasons sound plausible and may have their own justifications. In other
words, different Chinese overseas investment projects in different geographical regions
may be based on different rationales. In this regard it must also be acknowledged that it
would be surprising if the Chinese government did not to take strategic aspects into ac-
count. Governments of other countries must do exactly the same.
V. Final Remarks
The world order is currently undergoing fundamental changes, and it remains to be
seen where China will stand upon completion of the ongoing reshuffle. It is clear, how-
ever, that China is a strong newcomer in the international investment arena while, at the
same time, other countries have lost much of their former power in recent years. Success-
ful newcomers are always eyed with suspicion.189 This may explain the common reluc-
tance to accept China's increasing overseas investment volume as what it is, namely
evidence of the globalization efforts of multi-national enterprises located in a country
which has or is about to become a political and economic mega-power.
Overseas investments of Chinese enterprises are developing rapidly despite a rather
strict domestic outward investment regime. The increasing volume of Chinese outward
investments creates chances and risks not only for Chinese, but also for foreign parties.
Future developments must be monitored closely because China's overseas investment
strategies have the potential to destabilize the world, whether they fail or succeed.190
187. See WOLFF, MERGFRS & AcQuisrlONS IN CHINA, supra note 7, at 3.
188. Dr. Markus Ederer, EU Ambassador to China, has kindly drawn my attention to this aspect.
189. See McGREGOR, supra note 133, at 272.
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